The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") is the administrative agency that oversees the use of the electromagnetic spectrum in the United States.' In dealing with parties licensed to use the spectrum, the FCC plays two roles. First, Congress created the FCC in 1934 as a regulator with control of the spectrum. In this role, the FCC allocates licenses for use of the spectrum and oversees licensees' use of these licenses in order to prevent interference. Second, in 1993, Congress made the FCC a creditor by authorizing the FCC to conduct competitive auctions for nonbroadcast FCC licenses. Congress also instructed the FCC to ensure that as part of its auction plan, it reserved certain blocks of spectrum for qualified entities, including small businesses, and made available deferred payment plans on favorable terms.' These spectrum auctions have generated billions of dollars in revenue as wireless technologies have developed. 
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create an orderly proceeding that avoids a race to the courthouse, which could destroy the value of the bankruptcy estate. 8 The Bankruptcy Code provides an automatic stay to fix this creditors' collective action problem.' The stay gives the debtor's assets a safe harbor.
T M
However, the Code also prevents courts from enjoining a governmental entity's exercise of regulatory power." , reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 6179-80 (stating that the purpose of a Chapter 11 business reorganization case, unlike a Chapter 7 liquidation case, is "to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders").
8 When businesses encounter financial distress, creditors often rush to collect debts out of fear that if the business fails they will be left with nothing. Both debtors and creditors suffer if this rush is allowed. Debtors are hurt because their assets are often worth less when sold piecemeal and because they have less of a chance of retaining their businesses and assets. Creditors are injured because only those creditors who win the race are paid, while creditors who call their debts later end up with nothing. See Douglas Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy 168 (Foundation 3d ed 2001) (noting that creditors "are not indifferent between being paid now or being paid later" because they recognize that the debtor may become insolvent before paying his debts).
9 11 USC § 362(a) (1994) . 10 Under Title 11, the general rule is that bankruptcy petitions automatically invoke a stay against creditors. This stay prevents them from collecting on the debts owed to them by the debtor. In addition, the automatic stay allows the debtor-in-possession to deal with all of its creditors in the single forum of the bankruptcy court. See Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy at 17-18 (cited in note 8) ("As a practical matter, one of the debtor's most important rights in Chapter 11 may be its exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.").
11 11 USC § 362(b)(4) (1994) (stating that the automatic stay does not apply to "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit ... to enforce
The current circuit splits arose out of the FCC's auctioning of the C-block of the spectrum, a segment it had reserved for small businesses and for whose licenses it allowed winning bidders to pay using deferred payment plans. The FCC concluded two sets of C-block auctions on May 6 and July 16, 1996.2 In early 1997, a significant number of C-block licensees petitioned the FCC for relief from their installment payments because they had financing difficulties and faced the prospect of early default." A number of these licensees subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 4 The FCC declared the licenses canceled and attempted to re-auction them. The licensees in bankruptcy the FCC as a regulator whose regulatory actions did not fall under the jurisdiction of bankruptcy or district courts. 17 The Second Circuit reaffirmed this view in In re Federal Communications Commission. ' s such governmental unit's ... police or regulatory power").
12 The C-block is a section of the electromagnetic spectrum the FCC divided into 493 Iicenses and reserved to auction to small entrepreneurial companies providing personal communications services ("PCS"). PCS is a new generation of wireless-phone technology that provides the user with an all-in-one wireless phone, paging, messaging, and data service. See 47 CFR § 24.709 (1995) (discussing PCS).
13 (Jan 7,2002) . It is quite possible that the Tenth Circuit will hand down a decision in this case that will view the scope of the FCC's regulatory power in bankruptcy proceedings in a different way than the other three circuits that have weighed in on this issue.
16 200 F3d 43 (2d Cir 1999). 17 Id at 62 (holding that "the bankruptcy and district courts had no power to interfere with the FCC's system for allocating spectrum licenses").
18 217 F3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir 2000) (reaffirming that "the FCC's licensing decisions are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals").
In NextWave Personal Communications, Inc v FCC, 9 the D.C. Circuit, examining an identical set of facts, reasoned that the FCC was a regulator subject to its jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Code.m In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in In re GWI PCS lnc, another case with almost exactly the same fact pattern as the Second and D.C. Circuits had confronted in the NextWave cases, held that bankruptcy and district courts had jurisdiction over the FCC in a bankruptcy proceeding involving a licensee.-These decisions have created a three-way circuit split concerning the nature and scope of the FCC's regulatory power in future bankruptcy proceedings involving licensees. Should the FCC be allowed to act as a regulator with whom the bankruptcy and district courts cannot interfere, or should it be treated as a creditor over whom these courts have jurisdiction?
This Comment argues that issues of jurisdiction in bankruptcy should turn on regulatory competence, and that making decisions in a bankruptcy proceeding is beyond the FCC's regulatory competence. Although the FCC's rules controlling the use of licenses should have effect in bankruptcy, the FCC, as an entity interested in collecting a fixed sum, should be considered an ordinary creditor in the bankruptcy process. Part I of the Comment explains the split between the Second, D.C., and Fifth Circuits. Part II analyzes the incompatibilities and tensions that prevail in the current state of the law. Part III briefly proposes a solution, namely, that the power of a regulatory agency in bankruptcy proceedings should be limited to its regulatory competence, and illustrates how this solution works in practice through a land use hypothetical. Part IV looks more closely at how this solution is supported by the Bankruptcy Code and shows how the solution can be applied to the FCC. what happens when a federal regulatory agency seeks to control a debtor's assets.2' Prior to filing for bankruptcy, MCorp induced two subsidiary banks to extend credit to an affiliate and entered into other transactions that may have violated federal banking law. 26 The Board of the Federal Reserve ("Board") began two administrative proceedings: one before and another after MCorp had entered bankruptcy.
The Court held that the district court could neither review nor enjoin the Board's ongoing administrative proceedings.2 It rebuffed MCorp's assertion that the Board had violated the automatic stay by attempting to enforce a prepetition claim. Instead, the Court found that the Board's actions came under the regulatory power exception to the automatic stay found in Section 362(b)(4) of Title 11. It reasoned that "MCorp's broad reading of the stay provisions would require bankruptcy courts to scrutinize the validity of every administrative or enforcement action brought against a bankrupt entity." Such a reading is problematic, "both because it conflicts with the broad discretion Congress has expressly granted many administrative entities and because it is inconsistent with the limited authority Congress has vested in bankruptcy courts."
The Court also held that the proceedings might end in a final order that would impair the bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over property of the estate.3" However, the Board's actions were not in violation of the automatic stay until this occurred. 31 The Court suggested that "it may well be proper for the Bankruptcy Court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1334(b)" if the Board's proceedings were to culminate in a final order. 2 Thus, the Supreme (2001 ') . After a hearing, the bankruptcy court handed down five decisions and orders. In its first NextWave decision, the court asserted jurisdiction over the case because, in its opinion, NextWave's claim against the FCC did not relate to "any regulatory conduct on the part of the FCC," but instead concerned the debtor-creditor relationship between the FCC and NextWave. See id at 269 (noting NextWave's first cause of action merely asserted that the alleged transfer executed by NextWave and transferred to the FCC exceeded the value of property received by NextWave).
After establishing jurisdiction, the court held that NextWave's winning bid was greater than the fair market value of the licenses at the time of conveyance, and avoided $3. payment of the winning bid' a regulatory condition for obtaining and retaining a spectrum license," and this condition had a purpose "related directly to the FCC's implementation of the spectrum auctions." ' 4 Second, the court held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the claim. Jurisdiction over claims brought against the FCC in its regulatory capacity lies exclusively in the federal courts of appeals. 3 Thus, "the bankruptcy and district courts lacked jurisdiction to decide the question of whether NextWave had satisfied the regulatory conditions placed by the FCC upon its retention of the Licenses." Third, the Second Circuit held that the bankruptcy court impaired the FCC's method for selecting licensees by "effectively awarding the Licenses to an entity that the FCC determined was not entitled to them." 7 In so doing, it "exercised the FCC's radio-licensing function," which was something it was "utterly without the power" to do. CFR § 24.708 (1994)). The purpose was to make the FCC's default rules and penalties enforceable, "because the FCC relied upon them as a substitute for conducting the 'detailed credit checks' and other forms of due diligence that otherwise would be necessary to ensure ... that the licenses would be awarded to the appropriate entities. 37 Id at 55. 38 Id.
39 Id ("[E]ven if the bankruptcy and district courts were right in concluding that granting the Licenses at a small fraction of NextWave's original successful bid price best effectuated the FCA's goals, they were utterly without the power to order that NextWave be allowed to retain them for that reason or on that basis.") (citation omitted).
40 Id (explaining that the court has jurisdiction over those transactions that "do not touch upon the FCC's regulatory authority").
41 Id at 56.
[69:1373 avoidance decision, the court held that the bankruptcy and district courts had no power to interfere, reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded for further proceedings. 2 Immediately after the Second Circuit reversal, NextWave proposed a new reorganization plan that provided for a lump-sum payment that would satisfy its whole 4.3 billion dollar outstanding debt to the FCC. The FCC protested against this plan, arguing that NextWave's licenses had automatically canceled when NextWave missed its first payment deadline in October 1998.4 The FCC also released a public notice announcing re-auction of NextWave's licenses." 2. The Second Circuit's FCC decision.
The Second Circuit subsequently reversed a bankruptcy courte' decision nullifying the FCC's cancellation of NextWave's licenses and reasserted the FCC's jurisdiction." It granted the FCC a writ of mandamus to enforce its holding in NextWave. The court stated: "The FCC need not defend its regulatory calculus in the bankruptcy court, whenever an FCC decision implicates its exclusive power to dictate the terms and conditions of licensure, the decision is regulatory ....
[Therefore,] it may not be altered or impeded by any court lacking jurisdiction to review it."' The Second Circuit concluded that the bank- [L]icenses for operation on frequencies as to which previous licenses have cancelled,.. are available for auction under the automatic cancellation provisions of 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4)(iii)-(iv). The previous licensees were participating in the Commission's installment payment plan and were more than 90 days delinquent for the July 31, 1998 resumption payment.
45 See In re NextWave Personal Communications Inc, 244 BR 253,257-58,267-68 (Bankr S D NY 2000) ("NextWave VI') (asserting jurisdiction and affirming a prior court order holding that the FCC's cancellation of NextWave's licenses was "null and void" as a violation of numerous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a). The court, recognizing it lacked power to review FCC regulatory actions, id at 260-61, cast the dispute in nonregulatory terms. Id at 274 ("The FCC acted as a creditor, and ... not in any regulatory capacity."). It determined that the FCC's requirement of timely payment as a licensing condition lacked regulatory purpose, id at 270, and held that the Second Circuit's previous decision did not preclude it from voiding the FCC's cancellation of NextWave's licenses, which was based on an asserted violation of that condition. See id at 283. The court asserted that the automatic stay was limited by 11 USC § 362(b)(4), which provides an exception for a governmental unit that is seeking "to enforce" its "regulatory power." 4 The Second Circuit refused to consider the bankruptcy court's determination on the merits of the case because it concluded that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction. ' The court explained that under 47 USC § 402, exclusive jurisdiction to review the FCC's regulatory action "lies in the courts of appeals."" The Second Circuit thus concluded that the bankruptcy court "acted in derogation of this Court's mandate and beyond its statutory jurisdiction when it nullified the FCC's Public Notice."' The D.C. Circuit had a more restrictive view of the scope of the FCC's regulatory power in bankruptcy proceedings than the Second Circuit. It reversed the FCC's cancellation of NextWave's licenses, holding that although the FCC was a regulator, its canceling of the licenses had violated section 525(a) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code' Section 525(a) protects a person against discriminatory treatment by a governmental unit based solely on the fact that "such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor. 55 The D.C. Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to apply this section of the Code to the FCC, and 48 Id. 49 Id at 138. 50 See id at 139-40 ("The jurisdictional statutes leave no opening for the sort of jurisdiction over the FCC that the bankruptcy court seeks to exercise."). 57 The court read the Second Circuit's decision as principally holding "that the Commission's license cancellation was a regulatory act reviewable only by a court of appeals under section 402 of the Communications Act, and thus that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to apply the Code to these acts." NextWave v FCC, 254 F3d at 143. With one exception, the D.C. Circuit did not understand the Second Circuit "to have decided as a substantive matter that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prevents the Commission from canceling NextWave's licenses." Id.
The one exception the D.C. Circuit found was that issue preclusion barred NextWave from relitigating the question of whether the license cancellation falls within section 362(b)(4). Id at 148. The Second Circuit spoke "clearly and unequivocally about this issue." Id. Under the Second Circuit's jurisdictional reading of section 362, "this decision was necessary to the case: if subsection 362(b)(4) did not apply, section 362 could have provided a basis for the bankruptcy court to assert jurisdiction over the license cancellation." Id. Thus, in considering NextWave's Bankruptcy Code arguments, res judicata led the D.C. Circuit to "assume that the license cancellation" fell "within the regulatory power exception to the automatic stay." Id. Although the D.C. Circuit held that it was "a court of competent jurisdiction"' and that the Bankruptcy Code invalidated the FCC's action, the court left open the issue of whether bankruptcy and district courts had jurisdiction to enforce this provision. Thus, the D.C. Circuit, looking at the same facts the Second Circuit had examined in NextWave, held that the FCC was subject to its jurisdiction and that the FCC's regulatory power was constrained by the Bankruptcy Code.
C. The Fifth Circuit's GWIPCS Decision: The Bankruptcy and District Courts Have Jurisdiction over the FCC
In GWI PCS, the Fifth Circuit took a narrower view of the FCC's regulatory power than both the Second and D.C. Circuits. The Fifth Circuit held that the FCC was subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy and district courts. The court affirmed an avoidance judgment by the bankruptcy court that avoided more than 90 percent of GWI PCS's obligation to the FCC and allowed the subsidiary.debtors to retain the license' The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's decision that the FCC's appeal was equitably moot and held that the bankruptcy court did not improperly assume the FCC's regulatory authorityY9
First, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction to declare the FCC's challenge to the bankruptcy court's decision equitably moot, a "'recognition by the appellate courts that there is a point beyond which they cannot order fundamental changes in reorganization actions."""n The Fifth Circuit stated that even if equitable mootness was inappropriate, the bankruptcy court acted within "its jurisdiction to preserve property of the estate and further the reorganization plan." 7 ' In addition, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that 11 USC § 106, which abrogates sovereign immunity,7 applies to both the United States and the FCC and thus both were subject to the bankruptcy proceedings. 
2002]
Second, the court disagreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion that courts should defer to the FCC's interpretation "that under its regulations the binding obligation to pay the full bid prices attaches 'upon the acceptance of the high bid."' 74 The court instead argued that "where an agency's interpretation occurs at such a time and in such as [sic] manner as to provide a convenient litigation position for the agency," the court would-as it had in the past-decline to defer to the interpretation.? Overall, the Fifth Circuit had a much more expansive view of the jurisdiction of courts over the FCC in bankruptcy proceedings than the Second or D.C. Circuits.
Differing interpretation of the FCC's role in bankruptcy proceedings is the key to this three-way circuit split. Confronting three largely identical fact patterns (two of which were exactly identical), the circuits have gone in dramatically different directions.7 6 The Second Circuit has treated the FCC's decision to cancel NextWave's licenses as regulatory. Bankruptcy and district courts do not possess jurisdiction over the FCC in its regulatory capacity; such jurisdiction is vested by the Bankruptcy Code exclusively in federal appellate courts. When direct challenge was brought before the D.C. Circuit, that court, like the Second Circuit, treated the FCC as a regulator, but it struck down the FCC's decision to cancel the licenses as a violation of the Bankruptcy Code. The Administrative Proceeding Act, according to the D.C. Circuit, required it to set aside agency action in conflict with another federal law, namely, the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, the Fifth Circuit has held that bankruptcy and district courts do have jurisdiction over the FCC in a bankruptcy proceeding involving a licensee, because the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over the property of a debtor in bankruptcy and the district courts then have appellate jurisdiction. Different understandings of the extent of the FCC's role in bankruptcy proceedings drove each result. Thus, finding the appropriate role for the FCC in licensee bankruptcy proceedings would resolve this three-way split.
II. THE UNCLEAR ROLE OF THE FCC IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
In light of the FCC's ongoing auctioning of electromagnetic spectrum licenses to specialized groups of bidders and the ongoing contro- been ... revoked by the Commission," included NextWave. 7 If other circuits follow the Second Circuit's example and hold that the FCC is a regulator whose actions are only reviewable by the D.C. Circuit,7 bankruptcy cases would proceed directly from an FCC decision to an appeal to the D.C. Circuit. No bankruptcy or district court would be able to help licensee debtors restructure their debts to the FCC to retain their licenses. The FCC could cancel or revoke any licenses for which they could receive a better price from reauctioning or which the FCC believed could be put to better use by other, non-bankrupt firms rather than waiting for the debts to be restructured.' The D.C. Circuit's already crowded schedule would be burdened by appeals by debtors in bankruptcy from all over the country whose licenses had been cancelled or revoked." ' Second, distributional problems could arise from continued uncertainty over the extent of the FCC's regulatory power. The FCC's 85 Labaton and Atlas, Against All Odds, NY Times at S1 (cited in note 83) (reporting on the reaction to the D.C. Circuit's decision that the licenses should be returned to NextWave).
86 Id (These policymakers "fear that NextWave's victory could blow a hole in the budget that would force Congress and the white House to violate their pledge not to dip into Medicare and Social Security. The FCC has demonstrated that it may create economic inefficiencies when it is given power over bankruptcy proceedings.n It is quite possible that if uncertainty about the scope of the FCC's regulatory power in bankruptcy continues, the FCC would repeat its previous distributionally inefficient behavior.
Third, this situation could create a precedent in other regulatory areas. If courts permit the FCC to use its regulatory power to gain advantage as a creditor, other regulatory agencies could draw on FCC cases as precedents to gain a similar advantage in bankruptcy proceedings. Such action could seriously undermine the express purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy in cases involving these agencies as creditors.
Thus, a solution is needed to clarify the role that courts will play in future bankruptcy proceedings in which it is both a creditor and a regulator. This solution should also guide the FCC toward more efficient regulation, protect debtor corporations and winning bidders in FCC auctions, and American consumers. The solution would also uphold the purpose of Chapter 11 in bankruptcies in which regulators are also creditors.
M. THE ROLE OF LAND USE REGULATORY AGENCIES IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Part of the problem in defining the FCC's role in bankruptcy proceedings stems from the fact that this is an issue of first impression for most courts. 9 However, an answer can be found by adapting a solution that has been successfully implemented in the land use regulatory context. The role of a regulatory agency in bankruptcy proceedings should be limited to its regulatory competence: Agencies are competent to regulate how debtors use regulated resources, but bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over the property of the debtor's estate.9
The comparison between the FCC and land use regulators is particularly apt for three reasons. First, spectrum regulation may be com- 90 See HR Rep No 95-595 at 220 (cited in note 7) (explaining that the purpose of a Chapter 11 business reorganization case is to prevent a rush on a debtor's assets by creditors in order to preserve a firm's going-concern value so that creditors recover more of what they are owed, employees retain their jobs, and stockholders receive a return on their investment).
91 Prior to the FCC's adoption of the auction system in 1993, the FCC was rarely, if ever, a creditor in bankruptcy.
92 MCorp, 502 US at 40.
pared to real property regulation because both deal with the efficient allocation of a scarce good that is subject to problems with interference. ' Second, the FCC is similar to a land use regulator because its goal is to guide the development of a resource so it is used in a manner that best serves the needs of the public and is economically efficient. Third, the FCC and land use regulation have followed a pattern of allowing increasingly liberal practices: strict restrictions on use, fixed primary use accompanied by flexible secondary uses, and semifungible use."
The following hypothetical provides a framework for investigating how the regulatory power of land use regulators is limited in bankruptcy proceedings. Town decides to privatize a municipal theater by auctioning it off to private investors. To encourage small entrepreneurs, Town agrees to finance much of the purchase price. Firm makes a winning bid of $11 million for the theater, pays a $1 million down payment and promises to pay the balance over a number of years. Firm borrows an additional $10 million and uses it to buy equipment. Unfortunately, there is an economic downturn and the theater is less popular than expected. Firm cannot pay obligations to Town and other creditors. It files a Chapter 11 petition. Firm is insolvent. It owes $20 million, but is worth only $15 million. Two guiding principles define Town's regulatory power in the subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. First, debtors in bankruptcy are subject to the law. Second, debtors should not be penalized because they are in bankruptcy.
First, Firm, as a debtor in bankruptcy, still must obey the law. The theater is property'of the estate under section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.6 Firm's property comes into the bankruptcy estate subject to all its nonbankruptcy limits, including limits on safety and use. . 524 (1998) (describing development of author's idea to auction the spectrum: "The main specific problem I had in mind was the efficient allocation of space in busy streets of large cities, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to eliminate the combination of crowding and underuse that still persists."); Coase, 2 J L & Econ at 27-28 (cited in note 2) (analogizing frequency use to other private property rights).
94 See Coase, 2 J L & Econ at 10 (cited in note 2) (explaining that the FCC was established efficiently to regulate the spectrum for the benefit of the American public). Second, Firm should not be penalized because it is in bankruptcy. Town cannot provide that the lease is forfeited in the event of bankruptcy." Forfeiture provisions in the event of bankruptcy are prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code because they undermine bankruptcy policy by destroying the firm's going-concern value. ' 0 A theater company without a theater has little value (assuming no other municipality is offering a new theater). Thus, the Bankruptcy Code protects debtors from being penalized just because they have filed for bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Code honors creditors' rights, but in a manner that ensures that Firm survives if it is economically viable apart from its problems with its creditors. There is a difference between closing down Firm because the theater is unsafe and closing it down because doing so allows one creditor to gain an advantage over another. In the hypothetical, Town decided to finance the winning theater bidder. Having done this, Town must live with the consequences. It can continue to regulate the use of the theater, but as far as trying to collect what is owed, Town is a creditor.
If Town does not think the theater is being put to its highest value use while Firm is in bankruptcy, Town cannot take back the theater. For example, if Firm is running sparsely-attended dinner theater Shakespearean tragedies and Town believes the community would be better served by another company which would bring in Broadway musicals, Town cannot use its regulatory power to reclaim the theater.' Utilities Commission's decision not to allow the transfer of 300 of 600 operating certificates by a bankrupt taxicab company, because the certificates had become dormant through nonuse, was a valid exercise of its regulatory power that was exempt under section 362(b)(4)-(5) from the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
99 See 11 USC § 541(c)(1) (stating that an interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law that restricts transfer of such interest by the debtor, or is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor). In light of these two guiding principles, Town's position as creditor should be determined by its prepetition actions rather than by its role as a regulator. Town will argue that it should have priority over other creditors. However, Town should only have priority if it bargained for it and complied with nonbankruptcy rules governing the creation of a security interest in personal property.u If Town followed this path and took an interest in all assets of Firm, it would be entitled to $10 million. As a fully secured creditor, Town is entitled to the value of the theater, but not to the theater itself.lu Firm's going-concern value and the jobs it provides would be destroyed if Town were allowed to take back the theater. Town would benefit at the expense of Firm's other creditors, thereby defeating one of the main purposes of Chapter 11 bankruptcy: to prevent a rush on a debtor's assets in order to preserve a firm's going-concern value. ' w Town should be treated as a general creditor if it did not take a security interest. ' Divided interests arise in many situations in which a regulatory agency is a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding. Agencies must separate their role as regulator from their role as creditor in many contexts. For example, agencies have dual roles in situations as diverse as building permits granted by local governments and landing slots issued by the FAA.'° A guideline for making this separation is to limit the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in bankruptcy proceedings to matters in which the agencies have regulatory competence."3
Many courts adhere to the two basic principles articulated in the theater hypothetical in order to determine the regulatory competence of an agency that is a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding: (1) debtors in bankruptcy are subject to the law, but (2) debtors should not be penalized because they are in bankruptcy. Under section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the government is able to tell a debtor to stop operating in violation of a state or federal statute." ' Section 362(b)(4) provides that the automatic stay' does not apply to "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a government unit ... to enforce such governmental unit's ... police and regulatory power."" 4 The firm cannot avoid spending money to comply with government orders just because it is in a collective proceeding."' However, section 362(b)(4) also limits the actions regulatory agencies can take against debtors in bankruptcy. Section 362(b)(4) requires courts to draw a line between the actions the government unit takes in the exercise of its regulatory power and those it takes as an ordinary prepetition creditor.1 6 This line is not easy to draw because the government can argue that any action it takes is for a regulatory purpose. An action may still be regulatory even though a debtor must spend money in order to comply. " '
In MCorp, the Supreme Court created a rough guide to the extent to which agencies can exert their regulatory power over debtors in bankruptcy under section 362(b)(4): Regulators have the power to control the use of regulated resources, but bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over the property of the debtor's estate." 8 Courts have acted in this gray area to uphold the ability of agencies to exercise their regulatory powers but have also reined in agencies that have tried to use their power to gain an advantage as prepetition creditors.
A broad range of regulatory agencies have been affected by these The FCC wears two different hats in licensee bankruptcy proceedings: that of a regulator and that of a creditor. One of the most established bankruptcy principles is that debtors in bankruptcy continue to be bound by the rules that govern their ongoing operations.'9 All of the FCC's rules controlling the use of licenses should have effect in bankruptcy. The FCC has this right under section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code; the exercise of police and regulatory powers is exempted from the automatic stay. m Just because a licensee is in bankruptcy, it should not be exempt from regulation by the FCC. If bankrupt licensees were not subject to regulation, they could disrupt the FCC's regulation of the spectrum. One of the FCC's primary purposes is to regulate use of electromagnetic spectrum licenses.' 3 Therefore, regulating license use by bankrupt licensees is clearly within the FCC's regulatory competence and should be allowed by courts.
Second, the FCC also wears the hat of a prepetition creditor. Its transactions with NextWave and GWI PCS involved the issuance of licenses in return for promissory notes. The FCC, as an entity owed a fixed sum, should be treated the same as any other creditor in the bankruptcy process. The FCC should not be allowed to argue that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court when it comes to enforcing a promissory note. Serious logistical problems and economic inefficiencies would result from the courts' inability to subject the FCC to bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Deciding matters in a bankruptcy proceeding is beyond the FCC's regulatory competence for two reasons. First, enforcing a promissory note should not be seen as a regulatory action exempted from the automatic stay by section 362(b)(4). The Second Circuit in NextWave characterized the FCC's action revoking NextWave's li- censes as regulatory because the FCC made full and timely payment of the winning bid "a regulatory condition for obtaining and retaining a spectrum license. ' ' ln Although this action may have been regulatory in name, it does not have to do with actual use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Instead, it is an effort by the FCC to gain an advantage as a creditor that courts should not allow. There is no mention in the Federal Communications Act of the FCC's being able to use its regulatory power to enforce promissory notes.'m In addition, legislative history shows that the section was meant to help agencies pursue their regulatory missions, not improve their positions as creditors.'3 This type of action by the FCC should not be exempted from the automatic stay. Second, even if the FCC can justify actions to enforce a promissory note as regulatory actions protected by section 362(b)(4), FCC cancellation of licenses should be prohibited as a violation of section 525. Section 525 prohibits governmental units, for whatever reason, from canceling licenses solely for failure to pay a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy. " ' Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts must invalidate agency action if it conflicts with another federal law.'" The Act thus restricts the regulatory actions that the FCC is competent to take under federal law. The FCC's actions to enforce promissory notes by canceling licenses of bankrupt licensees should be prohibited because they conflict with other federal law. Such a conflict puts canceling the licenses of debtors in bankruptcy beyond the FCC's regulatory competence. This lack of competence should subject the FCC to the jurisdiction of bankruptcy and district courts in cases where the FCC cancels the licenses of bankrupt licensees. The FCC took a security interest in the licenses 37 and should rely on this interest in the same way as any other secured creditor, rather than trying to use its position
